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Abstract 
Inference networks have a variety of 
important uses and are constructed by persons 
having quite different standpoints. Discussed 
in this paper are three different but 
complementary methods for generating and 
analyzing probabilistic inference networks. 
The first method, though over eighty years 
old, is very useful for knowledge 
representation in the task of constructing 
probabilistic arguments. It is also useful as a 
heuristic device in generating new forms of 
evidence. The other two methods are formally 
equivalent ways for combining probabilities 
in the analysis of inference networks. The use 
of these three methods is illustrated in an 
analysis of a mass of evidence in a celebrated 
American law case. 
1.0 DIFFERENT STAND POINTS, 
DIFFERENT ANALYTIC METHODS 
There have been rapid advances made in our computer­
based technologies for performing complex probabilistic 
reasoning tasks. Thanks to the work of many persons, 
including ones I will mention enroute, we are now able 
to draw conclusions based on complex probabilistic 
arguments in the form of inference networks. However, 
study of such networks is certainly not a recent venture. 
I will describe some work done as far back as 1913 on 
the construction and analysis of inference networks; but 
until the early 1970s no one paid much attention to this 
work. Like many other tasks, the construction and 
analysis of probabilistic inference networks can be 
performed in different ways and to suit different 
purposes. Choice of an analytic method depends on our 
perspectives, frames of reference, or standpoints. 
For several years, my esteemed colleagues in field of 
law, Professors Terence Anderson and William Twining, 
have been arguing how advisable it is to clarify the 
standpoint according to which an analysis has been 
performed. As they mention in their work: The Analysis 
of Evidence [ 1991]. the standpoint a person adopts 
strongly influences the ideas and evidence one will 
generate during the process of discovery, the arguments 
one will then construct based on this evidence, and the 
inferential force one will assign to these arguments. In 
declaring a standpoint, a person describes the role( s) 
he/she is playing, the objectives underlying the analysis, 
the process being analyzed, and the stage in this process 
at which the analysis is being performed. Anderson and 
Twining further argue that failure to declare these 
standpoint elements, up front, causes many difficulties 
for the person presenting an analysis as well as for 
members of an audience trying to assess its merits. In 
some cases the method a person employs and describes 
may seem unusual until this person announces the 
standpoint that led to the employment of this method. 
Following are some elements of standpoints that led to 
the methods I will decsribe and that led Jay Kadane 
[Carnegie-Mellon University] and I to employ them in a 
case study involving a large mass of evidence in a 
celebrated American law case. Two of the methods we 
used might seem quite unconventional, but they may 
also be necessary, or at least desirable, in many 
situations. 
1.1 SOME OBJECTIVES IN STUDIES OF 
EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 
The major item on my research agenda for the past 35 
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years has been study of the properties, uses, and 
discovery of evidence in probabilistic reasoning. I have 
recently given an account of some of what I have learned 
in these studies [Schum, 1994]. Those of us working on 
early inference network studies in the 1960s had very 
little to draw upon in our studies. We were able to gain 
only a few relevant insights from the literature in 
probability, statistics, philosophy, and logic. One day it 
occurred to me that recorded experience and scholarship 
in the field of law might supply insights about evidence 
which we then lacked. I began to read works concerning 
evidence law and quickly realized what an important 
legacy this body of literature offers for anyone interested 
in probabilistic reasoning in any context, not just in 
law. Among other reasons, the adversarial nature of trials 
in our Anglo-American system of laws has forced 
scholars and practitioners in law to give very careful 
attention to the major credentials of evidence: its 
relevance, credibility, and inferential [or probative] 
force. 
I paid particular attention to the work of an American 
evidence scholar named John Henry Wigmore [1863-
1 943]. Wigmore is certainly the most prolific and 
arguably the most profound scholar of evidence in the 
history of American jurisprudence. In the field of law, 
Wigmore is most noted for his 12-volume work on 
evidence [cited in my references as Wigmore on 
Evidence]. In this massive work Wigmore attends 
primarily to the admissibility of evidence. Not so widely 
known among jurists, but of greatest importance in the 
studies I will describe, is his inference-related work: The 
Science of Judicial Proof: As Given by Logic, 
Psychology, and General Experience, and Illustrated in 
Judicial Trials [1937]. While reading Science of 
Judicial Proof, I was astonished to observe how many 
answers Wigmore provided to questions about evidence 
and inference that were troubling us at the time. 
From Wigmore's work I was first alerted to the many 
subtleties or complexities that can reside just below the 
surface of inferences we might believe to be quite 
simple. He verified my suspicion that, except in 
contrived situations, all probabilistic inference involves 
chains of reasoning often containing many links. In the 
1960s we were using the term cascaded inference to 
describe such situations. Wigmore used the term 
catenated inference. From Wigmore's work I began to 
see how evidence items, alone and in combination, could 
be usefully categorized without regard to their substance 
or content and also to observe the different roles evidence 
plays in probabilistic reasoning. Finally, I was 
particulary enthusiastic about his analytic and synthetic 
methods for making sense out of masses of evidence. 
These methods involve constructing arguments in 
defense of the relevance and credibility of different 
discernible forms and combinations of evidence. I believe 
Wigmore to have been the very first person to study the 
process of constructing and analyzing what today we call 
inference networks. He began these studies 86 years ago 
[Wigmore, 1913]. In Section 2.1 I describe a small 
portion of one of his inference networks. 
Wigmore's works suggest other objectives such as 
probabilistic studies of various recurrent forms and 
combinations of evidence, which I have described 
elsewhere [Schum, 1994, 66-130]. Briefly, the forms 
identify whether the evidence is tangible, testimonial in 
various ways, is missing, or refers to accepted facts from 
authoritative records. Various recurrent combinations of 
evidence refer to different patterns of evidential harmony 
and dissonance as well as to different patterns of 
evidential synergism and redundancy. Each form and 
combination of evidence has a unique structural identity. 
In these studies I made use of likelihood ratios from 
Bayes's rule to study how the inferential force of various 
forms and combinations of evidence depends on the 
likelihood ingredients of these likelihood ratios I derived 
to correspond to arguments based on various forms and 
combinations of evidence. In the process, I observed how 
the concept of conditional nonindependence is the 
major vehicle in conventional probability for capturing 
evidential subtleties or complexities. In Section 3.2 I 
provide some examples of the likelihood ratios I have 
studied for various evidential situations. My essential 
research strategy was to perform sensitivity analyses on 
the likelihood ratios I identified. It was from these 
sensitivity analyses that I learned additional things about 
the many subtleties that are associated with evidence and 
that are so commonly overlooked. Von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards once referred to this work as Bayes's rule 
meeting "ungodly inferences" [von Winterfeldt & 
Edwards, 1986, 163-204]. 
In many probabilistic studies of evidence it is very 
useful to have likelihood ratio equations because they 
help to explain more easily how the inferential force of 
evidence varies in response to changes in necessary 
ingredients of these equations. Given the nonlinearity of 
these equations and their many ingredient likelihoods, 
there are always surprises. In some cases, what seem to 
be major changes in ingredient likelihoods produce very 
small changes in a likelihood ratio. In other cases, 
however, exquisitely small changes in likelihood 
ingredients can produce drastic changes in a likelihood 
ratio. As the forms and combinations of evidence I 
examined became more complex, so did the likelihood 
ratios I had to derive in order to capture this complexity. 
Eventually, the task of deriving these likelihood ratios 
became unmanageable. I was greatly assisted by the 
doctoral dissertation work of Anne Martin who, to my 
knowledge, was the first person to program a computer 
so that it can behave as if it knows what likelihood ratio 
is appropriate to the structures associated with possible 
forms and combinations of evidence. Her program is 
called CASPRO [Martin, 1980]. 
For all his other accomplishments, Wigmore was no 
probabilist. Though he appreciated the fact that the 
linkages among elements of his inference networks were 
probabilistic in nature, he was only able to express these 
linkages in words, or in terms of fuzzy probabilities, as 
we would say today. Further, he provided no insights 
about how all the verbally-stated probabilities on his 
networks might be combined. Lotti Zadeh was not 
around in Wigmore's time to show him how this might 
be accomplished. The emergence of computers naturally 
stimulated interest in developing efficient computational 
methods for aggregating or propagating probabilities in 
inference networks. The works of Pearl [1982, 1988], 
Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter [1988] and others hastened 
the development of commercially available software 
systems for the probabilistic analysis of inference or 
belief networks. I became interested in using these 
systems in probabilistic studies of inference networks 
constructed according to Wigmore's analytic and 
synthetic methods; an example follows in Section 3.3. 
2.0 THREE METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
Here are three methods of analysis that I will describe, 
the first of which is entirely structural in nature. 
2.1 WIGMORE'S ANALYTIC AND 
SYNTHETIC METHODS 
Suppose we have some existing mass of evidence and 
wish to construct arguments from this evidence to 
hypotheses being entertained. By such arguments we 
hope to establish the relevance, credibility, and 
inferential force credentials of items in this mass. Such 
situations occur very frequently in law, history, 
intelligence analysis, and in other contexts. Wigmore 
pondered the problem of establishing these credentials for 
masses of evidence items having a variety of different 
properties. He understood that arguments we construct 
from evidence to hypotheses or matters to be proven are 
all exercises in imaginative reasoning; different persons 
might construct quite different arguments from the same 
evidence. Constructing an argument from evidence to 
some hypothesis is essentially to provide a plausible and 
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defensible chain of reasoning from the evidence to this 
hypothesis. Each link in such a chain identifies a 
possible source of uncertainty that may lurk between the 
evidence and what we are trying to prove from it. 
Wigmore argued that it would be very wise indeed for an 
attorney to construct arguments in advance of a trial or 
other settlement so that these uncertainties could be 
recognized and any disconnects [non sequiturs] in this 
argument could be identified and remedied. 
Wigmore's work, although many decades old, is 
certainly not obsolete. His insights about probabilistic 
arguments based on evidence deserve serious attention. In 
fact, more recent works on the construction and analysis 
of arguments say many of the same things Wigmore 
did, but without any awareness of his earlier work 
[Toulmin, 1958; Toulmin, Reike, & Janik, 1984]. 
Inferences in legal affairs, whether civil or criminal, have 
an interesting structural characteristic that is illustrated 
below in Figure 1. In referring to hypotheses, Wigmore 
used the term probandum [matter to be proven]. In any 
civil or criminal case the ultimate probandum [ITul is 
the major hypothesis, civil claim, or criminal change at 
issue in the case at hand. For example, ITu might be: 
"Defendant X committed first degree murder in the 
slaying of Y on 30 January, 1999". Our substantive 
laws state exactly what elements or points must be 
proven [at some forensic standard such as "beyond 
reasonable doubt"] in order to sustain this ultimate 
probandum. These points or elements, shown in Figure 
1 as IT 1, ITz, IT3, and IT4, Wigmore called penultimate 
probanda. Different civil complaints or criminal charges 
of course have different penultimate probanda. In a 
charge of first degree murder, for example, the 
penultimate probanda are: ITt =Victim Y was killed; 
IT2 =Defendant X killed Y; IT3 =X intended to kill Y; 
and IT4 = X fashioned this intent beforehand [i.e. the 
killing was premeditated]. 
What all of this says is that inferences in legal contexts 
are well-structured at the top. Our substantive laws 
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specify exactly what points must be proven in order to 
sustain some ultimate probandum. This is an inferential 
luxury that is not provided in any other context I know 
about. There are no "substantive laws" known to me in 
fields such as science, medicine, history, or intelligence 
analysis that tell us what penultimate matters we must 
prove in order to prove some major or ultimate 
hypothesis. 
It is these penultimate probanda that supply touchstones 
for establishing the relevance of evidence. Wigmore 
understood that evidence can be relevant on some 
penultimate probandum in two ways. First, evidence is 
said to be directly relevant on a penultimate probandum 
if a plausible chain of reasoning can be constructed that 
links the evidence to the penultimate probandum. But 
other evidence can be indirectly relevant, or is 
ancillary evidence, if it bears on the strength or 
weakness of links [arcs] in chains of reasoning set up by 
directly relevant evidence. In short, ancillary evidence is 
evidence about other evidence and its strength or 
weakness. We might also term such evidence meta­
evidence since it is evidence about evidence. I will have 
more to say about ancillary evidence as I proceed. 
The interesting and difficult task, of course, is to 
construct arguments that link items in some mass of 
evidence to penultimate probanda such as those shown in 
Figure I. Here is a task that rests on our imaginative 
reasoning coupled with critical thinking. Our chains of 
reasoning must be free of non sequiturs or disconnects. 
Further, as Wigmore noted, we must not leave any 
evidence out of our analysis that could be shown to be 
directly or indirectly relevant. Either disconnects in our 
arguments or evidence left unaccounted for invite the 
criticism of opponents. Wigmore understood how 
difficult it would be for most people to construct 
probabilistic arguments from a mass of evidence. To 
assist in this task, he devised an analytic and synthetic 
method for constructing inference networks that link our 
evidence to major hypotheses. 
The analytic part consists of recording, on what 
Wigmore called a key list, propositions that define what 
we would today term the nodes on an inference network. 
Such nodes define the evidence, major hypotheses, and 
interim hypotheses appearing in arguments or chains of 
reasoning. In addition, Wigmore also suggested that we 
record inductive generalizations that provide a warrant or 
a license for reasoning from one node to another. One 
role of ancillary evidence is to test whether these 
generalizations in fact apply in the particular inference at 
hand. The synthetic part consists of drawing a chart 
showing the inferential relationships among the nodes 
identified on the key list. A small portion of one of 
Wigmore's inference networks is shown in Figure 2 
below. 
In Figure 2, evidence items are indicated by the oo 
symbol. Interim links in chains of reasoning, such as 7, 
are indicated by circles. The symbols on the arcs [such as 
< ] indicate the verbally-expressed strength of the 
probabilistic linkage between one node and another. The 
numbers identify propositions given on Wigmore's key 
list. The major hypothesis in this example concerns 
whether a victim, one Moses Young, died of poison he 
was allegedly given by a defendant named Oliver 
Hatchett. 
Notice that the arcs on this diagram go upward from 
evidence to hypotheses. Wigmore emphasized that the 
reasoning of interest is inductive in nature, from 
evidence to hypotheses. I will have more to say about 
this matter, since some of my colleagues have often 
chided me for having my arcs going in the "wrong " 
direction on inference networks I have constructed. 
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2.2 PROBABILISTIC ANALYSES 
Most but not all of my studies of evidence have involved 
a Bayesian interpretation of what is meant by the 
inferential force, weight, or strength of evidence. I have 
also been interested in studying interpretations of these 
concepts in other systems of probability such as L. J. 
Cohen's Baconian probabilities and the Dempster-Shafer 
system of belief functions [e.g. Schum, 1986; 1991; 
1994, 200-269]. The example of likelihood ratio studies 
of the force of evidence that I will describe in 3.2 
captures an important evidential subtlety or complexity 
associated with evidential redundance. 
In complex analyses, inference networks can be 
constructed according to a variety of different 
standpoints. In many situations we form an inference 
network as a model of how some complex process may 
work or unfold. Using imagination and background 
knowledge, we generate a model for this process that has 
many variables [nodes] indicating important sources of 
uncertainty. We also generate patterns of probabilistic 
influence by arcs indicating the direction of these 
influences among the nodes. As we know, all inference 
networks are directed acyclic graphs [incidently, 
Wigmore knew nothing about DAGs, but all of his 
networks have their properties]. 
In some but not all works on Bayesian inference 
networks the arcs are said to represent avenues of causal 
influence among nodes [Pearl, 1988, 117]. As I have 
noted elsewhere [Schum, 1994, 173-179], the concepts 
of relevance and causality are not the same; Bayes's 
rule works equally well in situations in which a 
relevance but no necessary causal influence can be 
discerned among nodes on a belief network. Inference 
networks, as models of complex processes, arise for a 
variety of different reasons. In some military 
applications, for example, an inference network can 
provide a basis for predicting future events. Other 
inference networks have been constructed for diagnostic 
purposes or simply to better understand some complex 
phenomenon. Inference networks constructed for these 
purposes may have any number of root nodes and so are 
unlike the ones I have constructed that typically involve 
just a single root node. Several different software 
systems are now available to perform the difficult task of 
aggregating probabilities in complex inference networks. 
In work I now describe, we made use of ERGOTM 
[Noetic Systems Inc.) 
3.0 A CASE STUDY: THE SACCO 
AND V ANZETTI EVIDENCE 
Jay Kadane and I employed the three methods 
just described in an analysis of an existing mass of 
evidence. To illustrate these three methods we chose the 
trial and post-trial evidence in a law case decided many 
years ago but which still excites great controversy 
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[Kadane & Schum, 1996]. On July 13, 1921 Nicola 
Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were convicted of first 
degree murder in the robbing and shooting of a payroll 
guard named Allesandro Berardelli in South Braintree, 
Massachusetts on April 15, 1920. After an unsuccessful 
six-year appeals process, they were executed by 
electrocution on August 23, 1927. There is little doubt 
that Sacco and Vanzetti were implacable anarchists [e.g. 
Avrich, 1991]. What is still in doubt is whether they 
were guilty of the crime with which they were charged. 
This case has been rightly called: The case that will not 
die [Ehrmann, 1969]. As recently as 1983 ballistics 
tests were still being performed on the firearms evidence 
in this case. The case of Sacco and Vanzetti is arguably 
the ranking cause celebre in all of American legal 
history. On some accounts the conduct of their trial 
represents the most serious miscarriage of justice in 
American legal history. Even if their trial was fair, there 
are many lingering doubts about the guilt of Sacco and 
Vanzetti. 
Kadane and I considered both the trial evidence 
[consisting of over 2200 pages of transcript] and 
evidence made available in many works published in the 
years after their trial. We considered a total of 395 items 
of evidence. Of this total, 226 items came from the trial 
and 169 items were generated after the trial. Here are the 
three penultimate probanda in this case, each of which 
the prosecution was obliged to prove to the forensic 
standard: beyond reasonable doubt: 
IT 1: Berardelli was killed, 
IT2: Berardelli was killed during a robbery of 
a payroll he was carrying, 
IT3: It was Sacco, with the assistance of 
Vanzetti, who intentionally shot 
Berardelli during a robbery of the payroll. 
What we have in this case is a species of homicide called 
felony murder. If Sacco and Vanzetti had just robbed 
Berardelli at gunpoint and had not killed him, they 
would, if convicted, have been sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Because they were also alleged to have 
killed Berardelli, they faced the death penalty. In short, 
the prosecution was never required to prove 
premeditation. The evidence presented by the prosecution 
on IT 1 and IT2 was not contested by the defense; the 
only contested issue in this case was IT3. 
The three penultimate probanda just shown represent the 
"relevance hooks" on which we sought to place the 395 
items of evidence we considered. Of this total, we 
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believed 164 items to be directly relevant on one or the 
other of the penultimate pro banda in this case and 231 
items we believed to be indirectly relevant or ancillary in 
nature. The prosecution had three major lines of 
argument on TI3, the only contested issue in this case. 
One line of argument was based on identification 
evidence and concerned what Sacco and V anzetti were 
allegedly doing before, during, and after the crime. The 
second line of argument was based on firearms evidence 
and concerned the weapons Sacco and V anzetti were 
carrying with them when they were arrested, the bullets 
taken from Berardelli' s body, and various other items. 
The final line of argument concerned what is known in 
law as consciousness of guilt [mens rea]. It was alleged 
by the prosecution that the behavior of Sacco and 
V anzetti when they were arrested, and at trial, 
demonstrated that they knew they were guilty of the 
crime with which they were charged. 
3.1 WIGMOREAN ANALYSIS: FINDING AN 
INFERENTIAL HOME FOR 395 ITEMS OF 
EVIDENCE. 
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Figures 3 and 4 above show a sector of our Wigmorean 
inference network that concerns what is called 
concomitant identification evidence regarding Sacco. 
This evidence concerns what Sacco was allegedly doing 
or not doing at the time of the crime. There are seven 
items of evidence, directly relevant on TI3, in this sector. 
Items 25 and 26 concern the testimony of two persons, 
Peiser and Wade, who were believed to be the 
We first employed Wigmore's analytic and synthetic 
methods in constructing arguments from the evidence on 
Tit, TI2. and TI3, described above. To do so required us 
to adopt the standpoint of the prosecutors in this case. 
Neither the prosecution nor the defense were ever required 
to generate detailed arguments in defense of the evidence 
they sought to introduce. The collection of arguments 
we generated from the 164 items of directly relevant 
evidence constituted our inference network. Having 
generated this network of arguments, we were able to 
find links in these chains of reasoning to which each one 
of the 231 remaining items of evidence were indirectly 
relevant or ancillary. Our entire belief network consists 
of 28 sectors, each of which concerns a specific 
substantive issue or line of argument on one or the other 
of the three penultimate pro banda in this case. Figures 3 
and 4 below concern the directly relevant and ancillary 
evidence in one such sector, that I will describe in a 
moment. Wigmore's methods are uniquely suited for the 
analysis of an existing mass of evidence. But they are 
also very helpful in discovery-related activities when new 
possibilities and new evidence are to be generated. 
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prosecution's "star" witnesses. Items 324, 331, 332, 
333, and 334 come from witnesses Frantello, Liscomb, 
!scoria, Cerro, and Guiderris who were thought to be the 
defense's "star" witnesses. All the rest of the items 
shown in Figure 3 as either black triangles or the one 
cross-hatched box are items of ancillary evidence bearing 
on the credibility of the witnesses who gave directly 
relevant testimony. Figure 4, which I will explain later, 
is the same as Figure 3 with the ancillary evidence 
omitted. Here comes an important point about our 
probabilistic analyses of the evidence in this case. 
There are no statistics available to support probability 
judgments on the arcs for the directly relevant evidence 
in our analysis. The events of concern in this case, as 
well as those in most ather law cases, are singular, 
unique, or non-replicable. The events about which we 
have testimonial evidence from these seven witnesses 
either occurred or did not occur at one time in the past. 
We cannot play the world over again n times in order to 
see how many times these events happened. If this is so, 
then what supports any probability judgments at the arcs 
from directly relevant evidence? The answer is that the 
ancillary evidence we have is an appropriate basis for 
judging likelihoods on these arcs. For example, what we 
learn about Peiser and what he was doing at the time of 
the crime forms the ancillary basis for credibility-related 
assessments such as his hit and false-positive 
probabilities. Notice that chains of reasoning from the 
ancillary evidence point to but do not connect to arcs on 
chains of reasoning from the directly relevant evidence. 
As I noted earlier, ancillary evidence is evidence about 
other [directly relevant] evidence and its inferential 
strength or weakness. 
Some might believe that we should connect all evidence 
on the same network and ignore the distinction between 
directly and indirectly relevant evidence. I believe this 
would be quite a mistake. In the first place, it would 
require a prodigious imagination to construct arguments 
from some of the ancillary evidence in this case to the 
penultimate probandum at issue, Ib. Second, this being 
a situation in which there are no statistics to support 
probability judgments, if we take away the ancillary 
evidence we have no basis for assessing the likelihoods 
Bayes's rule requires us to assess. My charting of 
ancillary evidence corresponds with Ron Howard's 
identification of evocative information that he says 
supports probability and value judgments on influence 
diagrams [Howard, 1989, 907]. In other works I have 
discussed at some length the treatment of ancillary 
evidence on belief networks [Schum, 1994, 187-192; 
Kadane & Schum, 1996, 85-88]. 
3.2 LIKELIHOOD RATIOS AND THE 
"STAR" WITNESSES 
I have another reason for showing you the inference 
network sector in Figure 3: Kadane and I used it to 
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illustrate the likelihood ratio method of analysis that I 
described in Section 2.2. Before I tell you about the 
likelihood ratios we derived for the directly relevant 
evidence in Figure 4, I need to tell you more about what 
the seven witnesses named above testified. For the 
prosecution, Peiser, who worked on the second floor of 
the Rice & Hutchins shoe factory in front of which the 
crime occurred, said he heard shots fired in the street 
below and saw, from a window, a man he identified at 
trial as Sacco at the crime scene. Wade, who was on the 
street about 150 feet from where the crime occurred, 
would only say that he saw a man who "looked like" 
Sacco at the scene when the crime occurred. 
Four defense witnesses, Liscomb, !scoria, Cerro, and 
Guiderris, were just across the street from the crime 
scene; all testified that it was not Sacco who shot the 
payroll guard. Several witnesses testified 
that, shortly before the crime, there were two men 
leaning against a pipe-rail fence in front of the Rice & 
Hutchins shoe factory and that these two men attacked 
Berardelli and another payroll guard as they passed. 
Defense witness Frantello testified that he saw these two 
men five minutes before the crime and that Sacco was 
not one of them. 
In Figure 3, item 317 refers to the testimony of another 
defense witness named Constantino who worked with 
Peiser at the Rice & Hutchins shoe factory. Constantino 
testified that, when the shots were fired, several workers, 
including Peiser, dove under a workbench. Here is a good 
example of the ancillary evidence I have mentioned. 
What Peiser was doing at the time of the crime, by 
itself, has no conceivable direct relevance on ll3. that 
Sacco shot the payroll guard. However, this testimony is 
indirectly relevant since it bears on Peiser's 
credibility. Peiser cannot have seen Sacco at the scene of 
the crime when it happened if he was under a workbench 
at the time. Other ancillary evidence in Figure 3 was 
further damaging to Peiser's crediblity. 
Kadane and I derived likelihood ratios for the evidence 
given by each of the seven witnesses whose directly 
relevant evidence is shown in Figure 4. The reader 
interested in examing all of these likelihood ratios can 
consult our work [Kadane & Schum 1966, Table 6.3, p 
199]. At present, I only have enough space to tell you 
about the likelihood ratios for Peiser's and Wade's 
testimonies that are shown below. They provide an 
example of the subtleties that can be captured in this 
form of Bayesian analysis. 
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Note: The events in these expressions are defined in Figure 4. 
For Peiser's Testimony E*: 
P(EITI3)[h -f ]+f 
LE* = c P P P , where hp = P(E*IE); fp = P(E*IE
c), for Peiser. 
P(EITI3 )[hp -fpl+fp 
For Wade's Testimony F* Given Peiser's Testimony E*: 
L 
_ P(EIE *Il3)[P(FIE)-P(FIEc)](hw -fw)+P(FIEc)(hw -fw)+fw 
F*IE* - where hw = P(F*IF)· and P(EIE * TIJ")[P(FIE)-P(FIEc)](hw -fw)+P(FIEc)(hw -fw)+fw ' ' 
fw = P(F*lfC) for Wade; and where: 
In LE* for Peiser, P(EIITJ) = 1.0 since, if Sacco did kill 
Berardelli, then he must have been at the scene of the 
crime. What is to be judged is P(Eif1JC): How likely is 
Sacco to have been at the scene of the crime if he did not 
kill Berardelli? The values hp and fp are credibility-
related hit and false-positive probabilities for Peiser. 
Now, the likelhood ratio for Wade's testimony, LF*IE*• 
is quite interesting since the force of Wade's testimony 
depends, in part, on Peiser's credibility. The subtlety or 
complexity here concerns possible evidential 
redundance. If we believed Peiser to be perfectly 
credible, and thus also believed Sacco to have been at the 
scene of the crime, then Wade's testimony can have no 
inferential value. If Sacco was at the scene of the crime, 
then someone who looked like Sacco must have been 
there. Wade's testimony has value to the extent that 
Peiser is not credible. The terms P(EIE*Il3) and 
P(EIE*f13C) tell us how much inferential value 
associated with Sacco being at the crime scene is "left 
over" after we have Peiser's testimony. The term P(FIE) 
= 1.0 since, if Sacco was at the scene, then someone 
looking like him must also have been at the scene [there 
was never any suspicion that the persons involved in 
this crime wore disguises]. What requires judgment is 
P(FJEC); How probable is it that someone who looked 
like Sacco was at the crime scene, given that Sacco 
himself was not there? The values hw and fw are 
credibility-related hit and false-positive probabilities for 
Wade. 
We employed likelihood ratios such as these to tell a 
variety of different stories about the inferential force of 
the evidence in the case of Sacco and Vanzeni. The 
stories we told, based on sensitivity analyses, involved 
different probabilistic beliefs that might be held about 
the ingredients in these likelihood ratios. These 
likelihood ratios supply endings to the many different 
stories we told about the evidence in this case. However, 
some of the stories we wished to tell about the force of 
this evidence were far too complex for likelihood ratio 
analysis. To find endings for these stories we used the 
ERGOTM Bayesian inference network software. 
3.3 ERGO AND BULLET III 
Shown in Figure 5 is an inference network, 
analyzed using ERGOTM, for an issue that arose 
concerning the firearms evidence used by the prosecution 
against Sacco. A forensic surgeon named Dr. Magrath, 
who performed the autopsy on Berardelli, testified that he 
extracted four bullets from Berardelli' s body and 
identified each one with a Roman numeral he scratched 
on the base of them. He also testified that the bullet he 
had marked ill caused Berardelli' s death. A 32-caliber 
bullet marked with a ill on its base was shown at trial 
and identified as Exhibit 18. When he was arrested, 
Sacco was carrying a 32-caliber Colt automatic, which 
was shown at trial as Exhibit 28. The prosecution 
offered evidence that Exhibit 18 [Bullet ill] was fired 
through Sacco's Colt [Exhibit 28]. Both the prosecution 
and defense were allowed to test-fire other 32-caliber 
bullets through the Colt automatic identified as Sacco's. 
The prosecution claimed that the markings on the test­
fired bullets matched those on Exhibit 18. Event M at 
s--
1lred a 
Spt•r &. S•ttD S.C.:.:. 
Figure 5 
Node 59 in Figure 5 says that Exhibit 18 was fired 
through Exhibit 28. If true, event M would favor f13. 
that Sacco did shoot Berardelli. However, by itself, this 
event would not be very persuasive since someone else 
might have fired Sacco's Colt during the crime. 
The "star" witness Peiser appears again with his further 
testimony that Sacco fired a weapon during the crime 
[event C at Node 60]. Other evidence concerned Sacco's 
possible ownership of Exhibit 28 [event G at Node 66], 
and whether Exhibit 28 was the same Colt taken from 
Sacco when he was arrested [event D at Node 64]. Events 
C, D, and G, if true, converge to suggest event B at 
Node 67, that Sacco fired Exhibit 28 during the crime. 
Here we have an example of an important inferential 
subtlety capturable in Bayesian terms. Events B and M 
are synergistic in their influence on lb. Together, these 
events have more inferential force favoring Il3 when 
they are taken together than they do if considered 
separately or independently. In short, events B and M 
seem to be nonindependent, conditional on the truth of 
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I13. There is another way to express this synergism. 
Event M, that Exhibit l 8 was fired through Exhibit 28, 
has more force on Il3 if we also consider event B, that 
Sacco fired this Exhibit 28 during the crime. 
4.0 IN CONCLUSION 
Bayesian Inference networks, now being 
employed with greater frequency, can be grounded on 
evidence having different forms and appearing in different 
combinations. In this paper I have suggested that 
different methods for the analysis of these networks are 
useful depending upon the standpoint of the person(s) 
performing the analysis. Although Wigmore's original 
methods are cumbersome, and now seem quaint, in more 
"user-friendly" forms they provide many insights about 
complex probabilistic reasoning and enforce a certain 
discipline in the construction and analysis of inference 
networks. In applications of Bayesian inference 
networks, when there is no statistical backing for the 
likelihoods these methods require us to assess, 
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Wigmore's methods show us a reasonable basis for 
subjective assessments of these likelihoods. This is one 
important role that ancillary evidence or evocative 
information [to use Ron Howard's term] plays. 
In reasonably simple situations in which it is necessary 
to explain why or how some result was obtained, the 
likelihood ratio method I described is very useful. 
Having expanded likelihood ratios at hand that show how 
their ingredients should be combined facilitates 
explanations and also reveals the many subtleties or 
complexities may lie just below the surface. One trouble 
with existing Bayesian belief network software systems 
is that their aggregation or propogation algorithms are 
buried below the surface. But these systems are certainly 
helpful and indeed are necessary in analyses whose 
complexity outruns our inclinations or abilities to write 
likelihood ratio expressions for the force of evidence on 
which a belief network is grounded. In some situations, 
such as in the case study I have described, we can 
profitably employ all of these methods of analysis. 
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